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Abstract
During the first half of the 20th Century, the period when all of the United States’
major workers’ rights statutes were enacted, the American labor movement claimed
the rights to organize and strike under the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S Con-
stitution. Beginning in 1909, it was the official policy of the American Federa-
tion of Labor that a worker confronted with an unconstitutional injunction had an
“imperative duty” to “refuse obedience and to take whatever consequences may
ensue.” At a time when union institutions were as weak as they are today, every at-
tack on workers’ rights was met with an impassioned defense of the constitutional
rights to organize and strike. At the same time, the movement took a long-term
approach to legislative reform, demanding the full freedom to associate in orga-
nizing unions and staging strikes. In recent decades, by contrast, the movement
has often shied away from defending the right to strike at moments of conflict
(the 2005 New York subway strike being a prominent example), and has shaped
its legislative proposals to fit what it sees as the short-run possibilities (for ex-
ample, the Employee Free Choice Act, which makes no attempt to protect the
right to strike). This article suggests that elements of the old labor movement’s
constitutional strategy might be useful in the struggle for workers’ rights today.
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“NEITHER SLAVERY NOR INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE”
FREE LABOR TODAY
IMAGINE THE GUN RIGHTS MOVEMENT WITHOUT THE SECOND AMENDMENT, AND YOU
get some idea how strange it is for the labor movement to be limping along
without the Thirteenth. Until the 1950s, the Thirteenth Amendment—known
then as “The Glorious Labor Amendment”—sustained workers’ rights in much
the same way that the Second Amendment supports gun rights today. When
employers or the government interfered with
the rights to organize and strike, labor leaders
and activists invoked the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.1 They declared yellow-dog contracts, la-
bor injunctions, and antistrike laws unconsti-
tutional. They sought labor rights legislation to
enforce the Amendment. If the American Fed-
eration of Labor had had its way, the Norris-
LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act would have
commenced with this declaration:
Every human being has under the Thir-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States an inalienable right to
the disposal of his labor free from interfer-
ence, restraint or coercion by or in behalf
of employers of labor, including the right
to associate with other human beings for
the protection and advancement of their
common interests as workers, and in such
association to negotiate through represen-
tatives of their own choosing concerning
the terms of employment and conditions
of labor, and to take concerted action for
their own protection in labor disputes.2
Like the gun rights movement today, the
old labor movement did not turn to the Con-
stitution expecting court victories in the short
run. Nor did the movement use the Constitu-
tion to appear more respectable in the eyes of
“the public.” Instead, workers and unions in-
voked their constitutional rights in order to
mobilize supporters, stiffen their resolve, jus-
tify confrontational and even illegal tactics, and
signal elites that workers were fighting over is-
sues of fundamental principle that would not
be traded away for a wage hike. Beginning in
1909, it was the official policy of the American
Federation of Labor that a worker confronted
with an unconstitutional injunction had an “im-
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art48
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perative duty” to “refuse obedience and to take
whatever consequences may ensue.” Every at-
tack on workers’ rights was met with an impas-
sioned defense of the constitutional rights to
organize and strike. When the state of Kansas
banned strikes in key industries, for example,
the AFL declared the law unconstitutional and
ten thousand coal miners staged a four-month
protest strike. Conservative business unionists
like Samuel Gompers backed radicals like Alex
Howat, the Kansas miners’ fiery leader, in their
open defiance of “unconstitutional” laws.3
Many intellectuals—including some who
claimed to be “friends of labor”—joined em-
ployers in pooh-poohing the movement’s Thir-
teenth Amendment claims. They pointed to the
text of the Amendment, which states: “Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their ju-
risdiction.” How in the world, they sneered,
could workers be in a condition of “slavery” or
“involuntary servitude” when they enjoyed the
individual right to quit their jobs? But labor
leaders and activists held firm and insisted that
without the rights to organize and strike, work-
ers could not be free. They charged that the
employers’ argument missed the whole point
of the right to quit, which is—according to the
Supreme Court—to give workers the “power
below” and employers the “incentive above to
relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome
conditions of work.”4 In an economy dominated
by large corporations, the right of a lone worker
to quit offered nothing more than the oppor-
tunity to exchange one relation of servitude for
another; either way, the worker ended up in
servitude. Only by organizing could workers
rise above servitude. As CIO General Counsel
Lee Pressman explained: “The simple fact is that
the right of individual workers to quit their jobs
has meaning only when they may quit in con-
cert, so that in their quitting or in their threat
to quit they have a real bargaining strength.”5
African-American workers testified to the sla-
very-like domination made possible by labor
injunctions. “I was raised a slave,” commented
George Echols of the United Mine Workers,
“and I know the time when I was a slave, and I
feel just like we feel now.”6
Gradually, labor’s Thirteenth Amendment
theory gained ground. Members of Congress
echoed it during debates over workers’ rights
legislation. Senator George Norris charged that
anti-union injunctions brought about “invol-
untary servitude on the part of those who must
toil in order that they and their families may
live.” Senator Robert Wagner contended that
without legal protection for the right to bar-
gain collectively, there would be “slavery by
contract.”7 The Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunc-
tion Act of 1932 and the Wagner (National La-
bor Relations) Act of 1935 did not specifically
mention the Thirteenth Amendment, but they
did incorporate the core idea that without or-
ganization the individual worker was “helpless
to exercise actual liberty of contract and to pro-
tect his freedom of labor.” By mid-century,
lower courts were beginning to cite the Amend-
ment to justify invalidating antistrike laws and
injunctions, and leading legal scholars like
Archibald Cox and Charles O. Gregory had
conceded the logic of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment right to strike.8
Unfortunately, that was the high point—
not only of labor’s constitutional vision, but also
of the movement itself. The turning point came
with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. At first, the
AFL and the CIO denounced the Act as a “Slave
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Labor Law” and threatened a campaign of con-
stitutional resistance that would dwarf previ-
ous struggles. But the onset of the Cold War
soon derailed these plans. With the labor move-
ment singled out as a hotbed of Communism,
most union leaders were more anxious to dem-
onstrate their patriotism than to enforce the
Constitution. William Green and George
Meany took the lead, arguing that compliance
was the “American way” and unionists should
put their energies into lobbying and election-
eering. This provoked John L. Lewis to issue
his now legendary retort that on the issue of
constitutional resistance the AFL had no head:
“I think its neck has just grown up and haired
over.”9 For the next half century, the movement
not only complied with the Slave Labor Law,
but accepted the Cold War Supreme Court’s
validation of its constitutionality.
Today, the situation is once again ripe for
the Thirteenth Amendment. After decades of
meekly obeying Taft-Hartley and other anti-
labor laws, labor leaders and activists are tak-
ing a more critical view. As Stephen Lerner put
it, “Obeying the law reduces us to walking, in
small circles, in front of facilities running on
scab labor.”10 The strike—no less essential to-
day than in the past—appears to be withering
away due to legal restrictions and the perma-
nent replacement rule, which permits employ-
ers to permanently replace workers who strike
for better wages and conditions.11 The right to
organize is in no better shape. The most suc-
cessful unions organize outside the NLRB elec-
tion process, using tactics that push up to—and
often over—the line of legality.
So far, however, most labor leaders and
activists have downplayed the legal crisis, es-
pecially when public attention is focused on the
issue. In December 2005, for example, New
York City transit workers courageously struck
in the face of New York’s Taylor Law, which
prohibits public employee strikes. Politicians
and media outlets ranging from Fox News to
the New York Times couldn’t say the word
“strike” without sticking “illegal” in front of it.
Union president Roger Toussaint held firm, lik-
ening the strikers to Rosa Parks and Martin
Luther King. “There is a higher calling than the
law,” he declared. “That is justice and equality.”
For a precious moment, public attention was
riveted on the plight of workers who lack the
right to strike. The old labor movement seized
on such moments to assert the Thirteenth
Amendment right to strike, and national labor
leaders like Samuel Gompers honored strikers
for upholding the constitutional rights of all
workers. But today’s labor leaders have lost that
tradition, and the moment passed without any-
body daring to assert the right to strike. This
experience leaves us with a serious question: If
union leaders and activists don’t take workers’
rights seriously, then why should politicians,
judges, or the public?
Consider Roger Toussaint’s analogy to
Rosa Parks. Like Parks, the transit strikers
bravely defied an unjust law. And like Parks
(who had worked with both the NAACP’s
Montgomery Chapter and the Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters) the transit strikers were
part of a broader movement that was positioned
to support their struggle. Unlike Parks, how-
ever, the transit workers were severed from their
movement’s tradition of struggling for funda-
mental rights. The NAACP claimed that Parks
was exercising her Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection of the laws.12 The AFL-
CIO and Change to Win could have claimed
that the transit strikers were exercising their
Thirteenth Amendment right to strike. That
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art48
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
By
: [
Po
pe
, J
am
es
] A
t: 
19
:3
1 
14
 M
ay
 2
00
7 
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approach was implemented during the famous
Memphis sanitation strike of 1968. Many
people remember that when Martin Luther
King was assassinated, he was in Memphis sup-
porting an “illegal” strike by city sanitation
workers. Few recall, however, that the Mem-
phis strikers’ union denied that the strike was
illegal. AFSCME field director P.J. Ciampa
maintained that workers need not submit to
“indentured servitude,” and that, as free Ameri-
cans, they could cease work until they obtained
decent wages and conditions.13
Beyond protecting the right to strike, the
Thirteenth Amendment could, for the first
time, bring the Bill of Rights into the workplace.
As it is now, workers leave behind their consti-
tutional rights of free speech and association
when they enter company property. This is be-
cause the First Amendment does not bind pri-
vate employers. “Congress shall make no law,”
it declares, “abridging the freedom of speech . . .
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble”
(emphasis added). Thus, employers are
free to fire workers merely for express-
ing their opinions. In one case, for ex-
ample, a court ruled that it was perfectly
legal for an employer to fire an em-
ployee for saying the words: “Black
workers have rights too.”14 The Thir-
teenth Amendment, on the other hand,
protects against both government and
private actors. It prohibits slavery and
involuntary servitude regardless of who
is to blame. In the words of the Supreme Court,
it guarantees those rights that are necessary to
provide workers with the “power below” to pre-
vent a “harsh overlordship or unwholesome
conditions of work.” We contend that free
speech is one of those rights.15
Here, the Thirteenth Amendment gives
voice to a widely held intuition. Most people
are shocked to discover that employers can le-
gally fire workers for engaging in free speech.
Why should the Bill of Rights stop at the
corporation’s doorstep? Employers are quick to
respond that it is a question of property rights.
They own the property, so they can conduct
antiunion propaganda on work time while pro-
hibiting union supporters from doing the same.
They own the property, so they can keep union
organizers out while inviting antiunion consult-
ants in. They own the property, so they can
compel workers to listen to captive audience
speeches. They own the property, so they can
order supervisors to campaign against the
union or be fired.16 Add up all these property
rights, and you get a property right to control
the workers, and that is what the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits.
Could the Thirteenth Amendment idea
win the support of labor activists today as it did
in the early twentieth century? We have reason
to believe that the answer is yes. In 2002, the
Labor Party (a national organization composed
of international unions and regional and local
labor organizations) endorsed an updated ver-
sion of the idea as a proposal for discussion.17
When the New Jersey Industrial Union Coun-
cil presented it to two hundred local union lead-
Beyond protecting the right
to strike, the Thirteenth
Amendment could, for the
first time, bring the Bill of
Rights into the workplace.
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ers and activists at its 2003 annual meeting, the
response was strongly positive. Twenty of the
participants volunteered to attend a full-day
training workshop to learn how to pass the
Thirteenth Amendment idea on to others.
Suppose that the labor movement were to
revive the Thirteenth Amendment idea. How
would its activity change? First and foremost,
it would function as a rights movement, seiz-
ing every opportunity to claim and justify the
constitutional rights to organize and strike.
Every year, thousands of workers exercise their
rights in defiance of unconstitutional laws and
employer policies. Each of these courageous
moments of resistance presents a precious op-
portunity to assert constitutional rights—as the
NAACP did with Rosa Parks, and as the
Gompers-led AFL did with workers who de-
fied injunctions and antistrike laws. The New
York City transit strike, for example, should
have been an occasion for labor leaders to cel-
ebrate the strikers’ resistance and affirm their
right to strike. When labor leaders publicly
charge that a law is unconstitutional and void,
they remove an important prop from the sys-
tem of labor control. If the charge sticks with
workers, then the law is reduced to the status
of an arbitrary command backed up by threats
of punishment—the fate of antistrike laws and
the labor injunction in the early twentieth cen-
tury. Regardless of what courts do, the forceful
assertion and exercise of a right can go a long
way toward establishing it on the ground. The
old labor movement built up such a
strong rights consciousness that—even
though the Supreme Court had an-
nounced the permanent replacement rule
in 1938—it was not until the 1980s that
employers could openly give strikers’ jobs
to scabs. In the meantime, an unofficial
norm operated to nullify the rule.18
Projects like Jobs With Justice and
American Rights at Work are positive
steps toward reviving this rights con-
sciousness, but they would be greatly
strengthened if today’s labor leaders and activ-
ists followed the old labor movement’s tradi-
tion of asserting the constitutional rights of
workers during moments of confrontation,
when public attention is focused on the issue.
Second, the movement would approach
the struggle for labor law reform not as a mat-
ter of wheeling and dealing for the best bill that
can be won at a particular time, but as a long-
term, principled struggle for workers’ rights
legislation. This was the approach of the
Gompers-era movement, which campaigned
for the total abolition of antistrike and
antiorganizing injunctions until Congress fi-
nally passed the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-In-
junction Act of 1932, arguably the most effec-
tive workers’ rights statute ever enacted in the
United States.19 By contrast, the labor move-
ment of recent decades has tended to lurch from
one ad hoc bill to another each time the Demo-
crats make big gains (for example, the Labor
Law Reform bill of 1978 and the striker replace-
ment bills of 1992-94). The movement’s cur-
Add up ... property
rights, and you get a
property right to control
the workers, and that is
what the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits.
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rent bill, the Employee Free Choice Act
(EFCA), is a mish-mash of provisions, some of
which aid in the protection of workers’ rights
(for example, mandating monetary penalties
and injunctions against employers that dis-
criminate against unionists during organizing
drives), and some of which outright violate
those rights. Most importantly, the EFCA re-
lies on compulsory arbitration to help unions
obtain first contracts instead of strengthening
the right to strike. As the old labor movement
recognized (and as Roger Toussaint reaffirmed
during the transit strike), compulsory arbitra-
tion forces workers to labor under terms that
they never approved—a denial of basic labor
freedom. Furthermore, the EFCA reaffirms
Taft-Hartley’s mandatory injunction against
secondary boycotts—a provision that violates
not only the Thirteenth Amendment but also
international human rights norms. And al-
though the Act’s provision for card check rec-
ognition would help union organizers in the
short run, it also reaffirms Taft-Hartley’s re-
quirement that workers organize in fixed, gov-
ernment-approved representation units—a
provision that is increasingly out of step with
today’s rapidly changing economy.20
The EFCA’s proponents justify these pro-
visions on the ground that nothing better can
be achieved at this time. But this position ig-
nores the dynamics of labor law reform. Mean-
ingful workers’ rights legislation happens only
rarely, when extraordinary events upset the rou-
tine of ordinary politics. This is because
business, by far the most powerful inter-
est group in the United States, invariably
unites in ferocious opposition to work-
ers’ rights legislation and, although
unions continue to exert influence in ur-
ban states, there are enough senators
from rural states to filibuster even “real-
istic” labor law reform—the fate of the
Labor Law Reform bill of 1978 and the
striker replacement bills of 1992-1994.21
It would be far better to draw up a bill
that would actually remedy the principal injus-
tices of the Taft-Hartley Act and then insist on
it until conditions (judging from history, most
likely an upsurge in worker activity) make pas-
sage possible. Such a bill might be defeated
when first proposed, but—as in the campaign
for anti-injunction legislation—each effort
would add to public awareness of the issue. The
bill should include, at a minimum, abolition of
the permanent replacement rule, repeal of the
flat ban on secondary boycotts, and effective
protection for the rights to organize and en-
gage in concerted activities—all of which are
necessary to bring U.S. law into line with inter-
national standards.22 (For more on the interna-
tional dimension of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment idea, see the article by Jeremy Brecher et
al. in this issue.)
Some people say that the Thirteenth
Amendment idea is outrageous. We freely ad-
mit that it is—in the sense that it offends the
currently dominant view that workers can be
free without the rights to organize and strike.
Regardless of what courts
do, the forceful assertion
and exercise of a right can
go a long way toward
establishing it on the
ground.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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If Roger Toussaint had argued that the Taylor
Law violated the Thirteenth Amendment, he
probably would have been ridiculed by politi-
cians and the press, just as Samuel Gompers and
other AFL leaders were ridiculed early in the
twentieth century. But being outrageous is not
necessarily a bad thing. The outrageousness of
a claim may simply reflect the prevailing bal-
ance of power, and not the actual merits of the
claim. An outrageous claim attracts public at-
tention to the fundamental issue of principle,
and signals that the movement will stand up
for that principle even if it makes other people
uncomfortable.
The Thirteenth Amendment has three cru-
cial advantages over other possible sources of
workers’ rights. First, unlike other constitu-
tional provisions, the Thirteenth Amendment
squarely addresses the issue of labor freedom.
As Mark Dudzic has pointed out, the Thir-
teenth Amendment is the only constitutional
provision that goes beyond limiting govern-
ment power “to place a positive respon-
sibility on government to eliminate a sys-
tem of labor.”23 In the words of the Su-
preme Court, the Amendment was in-
tended “to make labor free by prohibit-
ing that control by which the personal
service of one man is disposed of or co-
erced for another’s benefit which is the
essence of involuntary servitude.”24 By
contrast, the First Amendment deals pri-
marily with “speech”—not power or con-
trol—and does not bind private employ-
ers unless in combination with the Thir-
teenth. Far worse is the commerce clause, which
was chosen, over the AFL’s opposition, to be
the constitutional foundation for the National
Labor Relations Act. As a result of this choice,
the NLRA protects workers’ rights only as a
means to the end of eliminating “certain sub-
stantial obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce,” namely strikes. This subordination of
workers’ rights to commerce has tilted the Act’s
interpretation toward employer interests, con-
tributing to such judicial creations as the right
of employers to permanently replace economic
strikers (what better way to protect commerce
than by making it difficult to strike?), the de-
nial of any NLRB power to deter unfair labor
practices (who cares about workers’ rights if
unions are not strong enough to threaten com-
merce?), and the punishment of workers who
respond to employer unfair labor practices with
forceful forms of protest like sit-down strikes
(why permit disruptive self-help when the pri-
mary purpose of protecting workers’ rights is
to prevent disruptions to commerce?).25
Second, the Thirteenth Amendment re-
sponds to the American reality that the worst
labor oppression is reserved for workers who,
like Irish-Americans in the nineteenth century
and African-Americans throughout, are con-
sidered to be nonwhite.26 Not only does the
Amendment prohibit involuntary servitude,
but it also empowers Congress to eliminate
what the Supreme Court has called the “badges
The outrageousness of a
claim [such as the
Thirteenth Amendment]
may simply reflect the
prevailing balance of
power, and not the actual
merits of the claim.
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and incidents of slavery,” meaning inequalities
based on race.27 From the outset, this combi-
nation has enhanced the possibilities for prin-
cipled unity among workers of all colors. After
the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, white
workers could no longer “derive satisfaction
from defining themselves as ‘not slaves,’” and
the struggle of black workers for freedom from
slavery became a model for many. Although
this moment of opportunity was soon termi-
nated by a resurgence of white racism, echoes
remained in the labor movement’s bitter denun-
ciations of “Dred Scott decisions” (labor injunc-
tions and other court rulings denying labor
rights) and “Fugitive Slave Laws” (antistrike and
antipicketing laws).28 In order to accept that the
Thirteenth Amendment was relevant to their
situation, white workers had to abandon the
comforting thought that their racial status im-
munized them from such a lowly condition as
involuntary servitude. At the same time, black
workers drew on the Thirteenth Amendment
to insist that full emancipation required not just
nondiscrimination (as some black entrepre-
neurs and professionals maintained), but also
effective labor freedom. Members of the all-
black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters held
that the Thirteenth Amendment would remain
a “dead letter” until white employers dealt on
an equal basis with black workers through their
chosen union. Only by organizing could they
win full citizenship and avoid the “lash of the
master.” Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment of-
fered the possibility of fusing civil rights and
labor rights into a powerful new vision of free-
dom. The Department of Justice pursued this
possibility for a time during and after World
War II, developing “a definition of civil rights
that included rather than disdained labor free-
dom alongside racial equality.” For example, the
Department maintained that the grossly sub-
standard wages and conditions of African-
American agricultural laborers constituted evi-
dence of involuntary servitude in violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment.29 Had this effort
prevailed, then we might have ended up with a
concept of civil rights that included mini-
mum labor standards and effective work-
ers’ rights as well as anti-discrimination.
Finally, the Thirteenth Amendment
covers all workers including farm work-
ers, domestic workers (paid and unpaid),
government workers, so-called “indepen-
dent contractors,” and so-called “super-
visors” who are excluded from the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and the Rail-
way Labor Act. Also included are un-
documented workers, some of whom are
covered under the NLRA but whose
rights are at the mercy of employers and the
government. Now that the labor movement has
abandoned its traditional hostility to new im-
migrants, the Thirteenth Amendment could
provide a constitutional foundation for full citi-
zenship and workplace rights for immigrant
workers. (See Maria Ontiveros’s article in this
issue.)
… the Thirteenth
Amendment responds to
the American reality that
the worst labor oppression
is reserved for workers
who … are considered to
be nonwhite.
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We freely admit that, as Joshua Freeman
put it, the Thirteenth Amendment provides no
“magic bullet” for the labor movement. But it
does supply a public, legal justification for the
intuition—shared by many workers—that the
rights to organize and strike are fundamental.
No doubt Freeman is right that “most Ameri-
cans, including most workers, think that if you
can quit your job whenever you want, you are
not in involuntary servitude.”30 But that is pre-
cisely the problem. American workers today are
bereft of any legal theory to explain the injus-
tice and illegitimacy of our labor law. When,
for example, the public school teachers of
Middletown, New Jersey, stood up one by one
in open court to defy the state’s flat ban on pub-
lic employee strikes, each was left to his or her
own resources to develop and put forth a justi-
fication. The labor movement is blessed with
hundreds of Rosa Parkses every year. Each
time that one steps forward without the
movement’s constitutional backing and moral
support, a precious moment of leadership is
squandered.  ?
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